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TREVINO V. THALER: FALLING SHORT
OF MEANINGFUL FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REFORM

Cristina Law*
Prisoners face many barriers when petitioning for federal habeas
corpus relief, especially when asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims. The Supreme Court’s decision in Trevino v. Thaler attempted to
lower these barriers by carving out a narrow exception to the procedural
default rule. Although a step in the right direction, this narrow exception fell
short of meaningful habeas corpus reform. This Comment argues that
although the Supreme Court’s decision in Trevino appears to guarantee
habeas corpus petitioners the ability to raise ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims in federal court, it is unlikely to provide prisoners meaningful
opportunities to assert these claims.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 500
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW AND
IATC CLAIMS BEFORE TREVINO .................................................... 503
A. Federal Habeas Corpus Review for State Prisoners................ 503
B. Postconviction IATC Claims before Trevino.......................... 504
1. Gideon and Strickland ....................................................... 504
2. Limitations on Federal Habeas Corpus Review ................ 506
3. The Path to Trevino: Coleman v. Thompson and
Martinez v. Ryan ............................................................... 509
II. TREVINO V. THALER ............................................................................... 513

* J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2015; B.A., Cornell University, 2011. I am
grateful for the editorial support and assistance provided by the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology editors, especially Jennifer Held, Carolyn Hill, Hannah Lonky, Bobby Murphy,
and Will O’Hara. A special thanks to Professor Robert Owen for his guidance. I’d also like to
thank my family and Shane for their ongoing support.

499

6. LAW (FINAL TO PRINTER) 7/20/2016

500

LAW

[Vol. 105

A. Facts and Procedural History .................................................. 513
B. Trevino’s Majority Opinion .................................................... 516
C. Trevino’s Dissenting Opinion ................................................. 517
III. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW .............................................................. 518
A. Trevino’s Broad Language ...................................................... 518
B. Lower Courts Distinguishing and Rejecting Trevino ............. 521
IV. TREVINO’S IMPACT ON CAPITAL DEFENDANTS IS LIMITED
WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FEDERAL
POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL ........................................................... 524
IV. SUGGESTED APPROACH ...................................................................... 525
A. Overview of Georgia’s Minority Approach ............................ 526
B. Advocating for the Georgia Approach .................................... 528
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 530

INTRODUCTION
As guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution,1 the “right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a
bedrock principle in our justice system.”2 In order to protect this
constitutional right, convicted criminal defendants are able to bring
ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC) claims; however, they must
closely follow procedural rules to obtain access to this form of relief.3 For
example, a prisoner who wants to raise an IATC claim in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding based on a state conviction must first exhaust all available
state court remedies.4 This means that the prisoner must have previously
raised the claim either on direct appeal or in a state habeas corpus petition.5
1
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
2
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
3
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013) (noting that a federal habeas court cannot
normally hear habeas corpus petitions if state procedural rules have not been followed).
4
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (“This exhaustion requirement is
also grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first
opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner’s federal rights.”); see
also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515–18 (1982) (recounting the historical development of
the exhaustion requirement). In addition to principles of comity, both federal and state courts
are bound by the Constitution and thus equally equipped to address constitutional violations.
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
5
It is worth noting that the state exhaustion requirement can take several years to achieve.
For example, Carlos Trevino’s trial was in 1997, but he did not set foot into federal court until
2009. See Trevino v. Thaler, 678 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452–55 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, Trevino v.
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Otherwise, the claim is considered procedurally defaulted and barred from
federal habeas review.6
In Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court preserved its longstanding rule
that states need not provide postconviction counsel to prisoners bringing
IATC claims7; however, the Court’s decision did ensure that substantial
IATC claims—claims that previously had been procedurally barred from
federal court as a consequence of errors by state postconviction counsel—
would be reviewed on their merits.8 By doing so, the Court sought to create
a special safeguard to ensure that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel—
the right that secures all other rights9—is meaningfully protected.
The Court based its decision in Trevino on the limitations of Texas
procedural law. Although Texas law does not place an outright ban on IATC
claims on direct review, the “procedural framework, by reason of its design
and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will
have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of [IATC] on direct appeal.”10
In order to raise an IATC claim on direct appeal, counsel must file a motion
for a new trial. However, in Texas, the trial transcript is not required to be
available until after the motion for new trial deadline,11 and the trial transcript
is essential for arguing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 12
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that direct appeal counsel will have the
requisite information and time to properly contest trial counsel’s performance
on direct appeal, thereby precluding any chance for relief later.
If the direct appeal is unsuccessful, filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in state court is the prisoner’s final opportunity for relief in that forum.
But if the IATC claim is not raised in the state habeas corpus petition, the
claim is procedurally defaulted, and federal courts are barred from reviewing

Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
6
See generally Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30.
7
133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013).
8
Id. at 1914–18.
9
See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (“Lawyers in criminal cases are
necessities, not luxuries. Their presence is essential because they are the means through which
the other rights of the person on trial are secured.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921.
11
See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4 (2013) (a motion for a new trial must be filed within thirty days
of sentencing); id. at 21.8(a), (c) (a trial court must dispose of motion for new trial within
seventy-five days of sentencing); id. at 35.2(b), 35.3(c) (when a motion for a new trial is filed,
the trial transcript must be prepared within 120 days of sentencing; this deadline may be
extended).
12
Unless appellate counsel was present at the trial, the trial transcript is essential to
evaluating the performance of trial counsel.
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the trial counsel’s performance. Consequently, under the old Texas system,
if state habeas counsel failed to raise an IATC claim, prisoners could exhaust
all of their postconviction remedies without ever being given the opportunity
challenge the deficient performance of their trial attorney. In Trevino, the
Supreme Court fashioned a remedy to respond to this perceived procedural
injustice. This remedy allows prisoners to obtain federal review of the
constitutional effectiveness of their trial counsel. In Trevino’s case, this
decision enabled him to seek review of his death sentence.13
This Comment argues that even though Trevino appears to guarantee
habeas corpus petitioners the ability to raise IATC claims in federal court, it
is unlikely to provide prisoners meaningful opportunities to assert these
claims. First, Trevino’s broad language allows judges to distinguish a
different state’s procedural rules from the rules at issue in Trevino,
substantially limiting the impact of its holding. Second, the Court showed no
inclination to reconsider its prior precedent, holding that there is no
constitutional right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings. Without a
constitutional right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings—even if Trevino
makes federal habeas review available—indigent prisoners are left to their
own devices. Without the help of an attorney, it can be difficult to raise
successful IATC claims.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the history of federal habeas
corpus review for state prisoners and examines Supreme Court precedent
prior to Trevino. Part II presents Trevino’s facts and procedural posture, and
discusses the majority and dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the lower
courts’ interpretations of Trevino and also predicts the impact Trevino will
have on prisoners’ access to federal habeas review. Finally, Part IV proposes
that Georgia’s minority approach to IATC claims is a superior method for
protecting the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. In coming to this
conclusion, this Comment argues that IATC claims should be raised first on
direct appeal, where prisoners retain a constitutionally protected right to
effective counsel, as opposed to a collateral proceeding, where there is no
such constitutional right to counsel.

13

Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921.
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW AND IATC
CLAIMS BEFORE TREVINO

A. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW FOR STATE PRISONERS14

The writ of habeas corpus enables a prisoner to petition for
postconviction relief if he has been incarcerated “in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”15 A habeas claim is “an
attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”16
Successful habeas corpus petitions result in a new trial, a new sentence, or
release.17 These significant remedies demonstrate the integrity of the
American justice system, which is reluctant to incarcerate a prisoner whose
conviction is at odds with Constitutional and federal law.18 The Constitution
recognizes the importance of personal liberty, and the writ of habeas corpus
ensures one’s freedom is not taken away without just cause. A justice system
without habeas corpus proceedings would be disadvantageous for prisoners
because direct appeal would be the only forum for a prisoner to challenge his
conviction or sentence.19 Habeas corpus proceedings provide a means to
correct errors in earlier proceedings and ensure prisoners are rightly
incarcerated.
The Supreme Court has recognized “the historic importance of federal
habeas corpus proceedings as a method for preventing individuals from being

“Postconviction,” “collateral,” and “habeas corpus” are all used interchangeably to
describe proceedings and forms of relief available after conviction and separate from direct
appeals.
15
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012) (limiting habeas to violations of the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States in state proceedings); id. § 2255 (affording a parallel remedy for
federal prisoners).
16
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
17
See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1917.
18
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977) (noting that the writ of habeas corpus’s “root principle is that in a civilized
society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment: if
the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the
individual is entitled to his immediate release.”).
19
The Supreme Court has expressed the need for the writ of habeas corpus’s corrective
function. Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV.
557, 565 (1994) (“[I]f the state appellate courts failed to provide adequate ‘corrective process’
for full consideration of any denial of the prisoner’s rights, whether or not ‘jurisdictional,’ the
court could properly examine the merits to determine if a detention is lawful.” (citing Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 333–36 (1915)).
14
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held in custody in violation of federal law.”20 Originally, only federal
prisoners were able to obtain federal habeas corpus relief,21 but habeas relief
has also been available to state prisoners for nearly a century. 22 However, a
state petitioner must first exhaust all available state court remedies before a
federal court will review his habeas petition.23 Exhaustion requires that a
prisoner either raise his claims on direct appeal or in a state habeas corpus
petition, as long as it is the forum identified by state law as the proper one for
the claim involved.24
B. POSTCONVICTION IATC CLAIMS BEFORE TREVINO

The first part of this section provides a brief overview of a defendant’s
constitutional right to the assistance of effective counsel and when in the
judicial process that right ends. The second part of this section discusses two
Supreme Court cases that laid the foundation for Trevino.
1.

Gideon and Strickland

The story begins with Gideon v. Wainwright and the right to counsel in
criminal cases.25 In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court extended the
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel to all criminal
defendants, requiring states to provide counsel to any defendant who cannot
pay for legal assistance.26 Soon after, the Supreme Court articulated that a
defendant not only has a right to counsel, but also a right to effective
counsel.27 In Strickland v. Washington, the Court established a national
standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.28 To raise
such a claim, Strickland requires a defendant to show both that counsel’s
20

Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1916–17.
Ex Parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845).
22
See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923) (vacating conviction of state
prisoners complaining that they were convicted after a mob-dominated trial). Congress
subsequently codified this extension of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a) (2012).
23
Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
24
Like federal habeas corpus review, state habeas corpus review gives state prisoners an
opportunity to assert claims under constitutional and federal law that cannot be brought on
direct appeal. Additionally, in the “absence of available State corrective process” or if
“circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant,”
relief may be granted. Id. § 2254(b)(1).
25
372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
27
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
28
Id. at 686–87.
21
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performance was deficient and that counsel’s errors prejudiced the defense.29
Strickland sets a high bar for petitioners because there is a strong presumption
that counsel performed adequately.30 Additionally, proving that counsel
made an error is not enough. The petitioner must show that, but for the error,
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.31 As a result of
Strickland’s rigorous standard, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are
difficult to win.32
Although criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed effective
assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
right to counsel as ending after direct appeal.33 The rationale for this cutoff is
that “[p]ostconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial
than is discretionary direct review [where the constitution likewise does not
guarantee counsel]. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in
fact considered to be civil in nature.”34 As a result, a defendant who wishes
to fight his conviction is not guaranteed appointed counsel after direct appeal.
However, most states require that counsel be appointed to postconviction
29
Id. at 687. To show deficiency, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To show prejudice, “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
30
Id. at 689 (holding that “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31
Id. at 694.
32
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (stating that “[s]urmounting
Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task”); see also Martin C. Calhoun, Comment, How to
Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 427 (1988) (“Strickland’s basic flaw is that, while paying
lip service to the importance of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
it creates an almost insurmountable hurdle for defendants claiming ineffective assistance.”).
33
Cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (“A first appeal as of right therefore is not
adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective
assistance of an attorney.”). Additionally, “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
right to effective counsel ends at direct appeal and that prisoners do not have a constitutional
right to counsel in collateral challenges to their convictions.” Mary Dewey, Comment,
Martinez v. Ryan: A Shift Toward Broadening Access to Federal Habeas Corpus, 90 DENV.
U. L. REV. 269, 275 (2012); see, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)
(“[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings”);
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1989) (holding that there is no constitutional right
to postconviction counsel in a capital case); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)
(observing that “the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no
further”).
34
Finley, 481 U.S. at 556–57.
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defendants facing capital punishment, 35 as was the case in Trevino.36 But the
vast majority of defendants are not facing capital punishment, and thus they
are not guaranteed counsel.
2.

Limitations on Federal Habeas Corpus Review

Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court established numerous
restrictions that substantially limited state prisoners’ access to federal habeas
review.37 These rules were designed to ensure that state court judgments are
accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal
proceedings within our system of federalism.38
While it is against American principles to imprison innocent people or
deny people their constitutional rights,39 habeas corpus review can be
problematic for federal courts for several reasons. First, collateral review
creates federal–state tension, since federal courts are second-guessing the
legitimacy of state court convictions based on state law.40 Additionally,
finality is an issue because federal courts are essentially reopening state
judgments that the state courts have certified as legally valid.41 Finally,
review is costly, because additional judicial resources are spent reviewing a
judgment that has already survived examination by the state courts.42 With
35
See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital
Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086 (2006).
36
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013).
37
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (restricting subsequent federal
habeas corpus petitions unless petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice for not including
the claim in the first federal petition); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (barring
federal courts from retroactively applying new rules of criminal procedure to grant a writ of
habeas corpus); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520–21 (1982) (establishing a “total exhaustion”
rule by requiring federal courts to dismiss petitions containing unexhausted claims even if
some claims have been exhausted); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981) (the
“presumption of correctness” requires federal courts to defer to factual findings by state
appellate courts); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (holding that, to obtain federal
habeas corpus review, petitioners must show “cause” and “prejudice,” or that failing to review
the claim will result in a fundamental “miscarriage of justice”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
481–82 (1976) (precluding petitioners from federal review of Fourth Amendment claims when
state courts “provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation” of the claim).
38
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012); see generally John H. Blume, AEDPA:
The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 265–70 (2006) (providing a more
detailed account of Supreme Court cases limiting federal habeas review).
39
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (noting that “the central purpose of
any system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the innocent”).
40
See Blume, supra note 38, at 274.
41
Dewey, supra note 33, at 274.
42
Id.
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these problems in mind, the Court and Congress have established certain
limitations that make habeas corpus relief difficult to obtain.
For its part, the Supreme Court has adopted the “total exhaustion” rule,
which demands that the entire federal habeas petition be dismissed if it
contains any unexhausted claim.43 This means that each and every claim
asserted in a federal habeas petition must have been raised in state court,
either on direct appeal or in state habeas proceedings.44 Failing to properly
observe state procedural requirements for presenting a federal claim in state
court results in “procedural default,” precluding a federal habeas court from
reviewing the claim.45 Procedural default is “an independent and adequate
state ground” for denying relief, regardless of the merits of a petitioner’s
claim.46 Since these are state convictions, in the interest of federalism, federal
courts will only hear prisoners’ claims after the state courts have been given
the opportunity to resolve the alleged violations.
Further, Congress severely limited prisoners’ access to federal habeas
review through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).47 AEDPA codified several of the Supreme Court’s restrictions on
federal habeas review and added additional stringent conditions.48 Most
notably, AEDPA created a one-year statute of limitations on the habeas cause

43

See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).
See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“Because the exhaustion doctrine
is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional
claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts, we conclude that state prisoners
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking
one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”).
45
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 86–87 (1977). For example, in order for a prisoner to successfully raise an IATC
claim in federal habeas proceedings, the prisoner must have previously raised the claim in his
state court proceedings and complied with all relevant state-law procedural requirements in
doing so. Raising the claim in state court “preserves” the claims for federal review.
Conversely, if the prisoner has failed to assert the IATC claim in his state proceedings, the
claim is procedurally defaulted and a federal court will not adjudicate its merits.
46
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30 (“This Court will not review a question of federal law
decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is
independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”). The “independent
and adequate state ground” can be the state’s procedural rules. Id.
47
See generally Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive
Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 702 (2002)
(discussing AEDPA’s barriers to federal habeas corpus relief).
48
Dewey, supra note 33, at 272; see Blume, supra note 38, at 270–74 (discussing
implications of AEDPA).
44
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of action,49 severely restricted subsequent habeas petitions,50 limited the
availability of evidentiary hearings,51 and granted federal courts the ability to
deny (but not grant) unexhausted claims on the merits.52 AEDPA also
retained the total exhaustion rule53 and did not alter the existing regime of
procedural default created by the Supreme Court decisions of the preceding
quarter century.54
Prior to AEDPA, Congress had passed up many opportunities to amend
or reform the habeas corpus statutes, leaving the Supreme Court to establish
the governing rules.55 With this broad power, the Court generally took a
particularly strict approach to the procedural default doctrine.56 In adopting
AEDPA, Congress enhanced the existing rules and added additional stringent
policies, making it “very difficult for habeas petitioners to prevail.”57
Nevertheless, AEDPA did not reject the equitable exception of
Wainwright v. Sykes, under which a prisoner’s procedural default may be
excused if he shows “cause and prejudice.”58 “‘[C]ause’ under the cause and
prejudice test must be something external to the petitioner, something that
cannot fairly be attributed to him.”59 In other words, “cause” exists when
49

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012).

The limitation period shall run from the latest of— (A) the date on which the judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B)
the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing
by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate
of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id.
50

See id. § 2244(b)(1).
See id. § 2254(e)(2).
52
See id. § 2254(b)(2)–(3).
53
See id. § 2254(b)–(c).
54
See id.; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
55
See Blume, supra note 38, at 269–70.
56
Id. For example, in Coleman v. Thompson, the Court held that the capital defendant’s
claims were procedurally barred because his attorney filed a notice of appeal less than a week
late. 501 U.S. at 728–29.
57
See Blume, supra note 38, at 268.
58
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
59
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (noting when procedural default is a result of ineffective
assistance of counsel during a proceeding where petitioner has a constitutional right to
effective counsel); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (defining prejudice
as when an “objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with
the State’s procedural rule”). Examples of adequate “cause” include “a constitutional claim . . .
51
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“some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to
comply with the State’s procedural rule.”60 The petitioner must also show
that defaulting the claim would result in “prejudice” due to the alleged
violation of federal law.61 The “prejudice” inquiry appears to be similar to
the harmless error doctrine:62 whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.63
3. The Path to Trevino: Coleman v. Thompson and Martinez v. Ryan
Two Supreme Court cases were critical legal developments leading to
Trevino’s ultimate holding: Coleman v. Thompson created a robust
procedural default rule, which Martinez v. Ryan chipped away.
In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court considered whether the
failure of an attorney in a state collateral proceeding to file a timely direct
appeal (to obtain appellate review of a state court’s postconviction denial of
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim) precluded federal habeas review.64
In other words, the crux of the appeal was whether ineffective assistance of
counsel constitutes “cause” to overcome procedural default under
Wainwright.65
The Court held that where counsel was not guaranteed by the
constitution, “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence is not ‘cause’ because the
attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance
of the litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk of attorney error.’” 66
Thus, the Court concluded that without a constitutional right to
postconviction counsel, ineffective assistance of counsel in the
so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel,” Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1,
16 (1984); the availability of new factual evidence that was not reasonably discoverable during
the state proceeding, Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988); and situations in which the
failure to develop facts in the state proceeding was caused by the state’s suppression of
relevant evidence, Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 671 (2004).
60
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. For instance, “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a
claim was not reasonably available to counsel, . . . or that ‘some interference by officials’ . . .
made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this standard.” Id.
61
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (“In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his
federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule,
federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the
default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate
that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”).
62
Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
64
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728–29.
65
Id. at 755.
66
Id. at 753 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
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postconviction context is not adequate “cause” to excuse default.67 As a
result, even if state postconviction counsel performs so poorly as to be
ineffective under Strickland, the prisoner remains barred from raising any
new claims in federal postconviction proceedings.
Coleman does not provide the answer to a key constitutional question:
whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in a state postconviction
proceeding where that is his first opportunity to raise an IATC claim.68 This
situation occurs where, for example, state procedural rules do not allow
prisoners to raise IATC claims on direct appeal, leaving state postconviction
proceedings as the first opportunity to raise the claim. Over a decade after
Coleman, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Martinez v. Ryan69 to
answer that very question. In this case, after being convicted in Arizona state
court, petitioner Martinez was appointed new counsel for his direct appeal.70
Arizona procedural law does not permit a prisoner to raise an IATC claim on
direct appeal; instead, the first opportunity to bring the claim is in state
postconviction proceedings.71 Accordingly, Martinez’s attorney did not
assert a claim of IATC on direct appeal, and instead argued numerous other
claims in hopes of obtaining a new trial.72 While Martinez’s direct appeal was
still pending, his attorney filed a “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief.”73
Unbeknownst to Martinez, his attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in
Arizona state court, but later filed a statement explaining that she had
“reviewed the transcripts and trial file and [could] find no colorable
claims.”74 The court then gave Martinez forty-five days to file a pro se
petition but his attorney failed to inform him of this opportunity. As a result,
Martinez did not file a pro se petition. The Arizona trial court dismissed the
petition for postconviction relief, affirming the attorney’s statement that there
were not meritorious claims.75 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and
67
Id. at 757 (“Because Coleman had no right to counsel to pursue his appeal in state
habeas, any attorney error that led to the default of Coleman’s claims in state court cannot
constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas.”).
68
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
69
Id. at 1309.
70
Id. at 1314. Martinez was convicted of two counts of sexual assault of a minor, and
sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole for thirty-five years.
Id. at 1313.
71
Id. at 1313.
72
Id. at 1314.
73
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.4(a) (2011); Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 733–34 (9th Cir.
2010), rev’d, Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
74
Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d at 734.
75
See id.
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the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, leaving his conviction intact.76
A year and a half later, Martinez obtained new counsel and filed a
second state habeas petition, raising an ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim for the first time.77 This petition was dismissed as procedurally
defaulted.78 Martinez then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, this
time raising an IATC claim and an ineffective assistance of state
postconviction counsel claim.79 Martinez argued that the court should excuse
his procedural default for good “cause” because he had inadequate counsel
both during his trial and during his initial state habeas proceeding.80 The
federal district court and the Ninth Circuit denied his petition, citing
Coleman.81 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a
prisoner has a right to effective counsel when a state’s procedural system
does not allow IATC claims to be raised on direct appeal; in other words,
where the state postconviction proceeding is the first opportunity for the
prisoner to question the adequacy of trial counsel’s performance.82
The Supreme Court found that Coleman did not control. In Coleman,
the petitioner claimed that his state habeas attorney was inadequate for failing
to file a timely appeal after the initial state habeas proceeding, but not that
his attorney was ineffective during the actual postconviction proceeding in
state trial court.83 As a result, the Supreme Court found that during that initial
habeas proceeding, Coleman’s federal constitutional claims were properly
adjudicated on the merits by the state court.84 Coleman did not resolve
whether attorney error during the state habeas proceeding would qualify as
“cause” to overcome procedural default.85
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, carved out an exception to
Coleman for several reasons. First, Martinez’s situation was troubling
because he was not afforded adequate trial counsel, nor was he given the
opportunity to assert an IATC claim.86 Second, without the assistance of an
76

See id. at 733.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
81
See Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d at 735; Martinez v. Schriro, No. CV 08–785–PHX–
JAT, 2008 WL 5220909, at *11 (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 2008). See also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.
Ct. at 1314.
82
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
83
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991).
84
Id.
85
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1316.
86
Id. at 1312 (“[T]he right to effective trial counsel is a bedrock principle in this Nation’s
77
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effective appellate attorney, a prisoner would have difficulty asserting an
IATC claim because he might not be able to conduct the necessary
investigation and might lack critical knowledge about the law, including state
procedural rules.87 Last, under Arizona’s procedural system, an attorney’s
inability to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel argument on direct
appeal, coupled with the failure to raise the claim during the initial state
habeas proceeding, could altogether deprive a prisoner of review of this
important Sixth Amendment claim.88 For these reasons, the Court created an
exception to Coleman, holding that
[w]here, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised
in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal
habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the
initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding
was ineffective.89

Although Martinez expanded prisoners’ access to postconviction
review, Justice Kennedy formulated what appeared to be a very narrow
holding to ensure the Court’s decision would not drastically impact habeas
jurisprudence.90 The Court did not disturb its established rule that petitioners
do not have a constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings.91
Moreover, Coleman and Martinez govern different proceedings. Technically,
Coleman did not involve an initial state habeas proceeding, but an appeal
from the initial state habeas proceeding. Finally, Coleman still applies to
most circumstances; Martinez reaches only procedural regimes where state
habeas proceedings are the first opportunity to raise IATC claims.92
Since Martinez only carved out a narrow exception to the Coleman rule,
justice system.”).
87
See id. (“Without the help of an adequate attorney, a prisoner will have similar
difficulties vindicating a substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Claims of
ineffective assistance at trial often require investigative work and an understanding of trial
strategy. When the issue cannot be raised on direct review, moreover, a prisoner asserting an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in an initial-review collateral proceeding cannot
rely on a court opinion or the prior work of an attorney addressing that claim.”).
88
See id. at 1314 (finding that Arizona’s procedural rules do not allow for ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims to be raised on direct appeal, thus making state habeas
proceedings the first opportunity to raise a claim of attorney error).
89
Id. at 1320.
90
See Dewey, supra note 33, at 280 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1319–20).
91
See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1326 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92
See id. at 1320 (“The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances
recognized here . . . . It does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first
occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, even
though that initial-review collateral proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.”).
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lower courts have been able to distinguish other states’ procedural systems
from Arizona’s and prevent the exception from spreading.93 Those courts
read Martinez literally and have limited its holding to states where the
procedural rules explicitly forbid raising IATC claims on direct appeal.
Martinez thus laid the foundation for Trevino because Texas’s procedural
system did not explicitly bar IATC claims on direct appeal, but made it nearly
impossible to raise them successfully.
II. TREVINO V. THALER
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury in Texas state court convicted petitioner Carlos Trevino of capital
murder.94 Eight days after sentencing, Trevino was appointed new counsel
for his direct appeal.95 Seven months after that, as soon as the trial transcript
became available, Trevino’s new attorney filed his direct appeal.96 The
appeal, however, did not contain an IATC claim.97 While Trevino’s direct
appeal was still pending, the court appointed Trevino new counsel for state

93

See Dewey, supra note 33, at 290–91.

[A] federal district court in California held that Martinez did not apply because California prisoners
are required to bring ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on collateral appeal only when
matters outside the trial record must be considered; otherwise, they may raise the claim on direct
appeal. Other courts have ruled that Martinez does not apply in Arkansas, Alabama, and Tennessee
because those states allow prisoners to raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal.
These courts ruled Martinez inapplicable because state rules do not bar prisoners from raising
ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, but the courts did not consider the feasibility of
raising those claims on direct appeal.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
94
See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013). At the penalty phase, the jury found
that he “would commit criminal acts of violence in the future which would constitute a
continuing threat to society” and that there were “insufficient mitigating circumstances to
warrant a sentence of life imprisonment.” Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415, 418 (5th Cir.
2011), vacated, Trevino, 133 S. Ct. 1911. Pursuant to these findings, Trevino was sentenced
to death. See id. at 418.
95
See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1915.
96
See id.
97
See id. Death penalty trials are bifurcated. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
The “guilt-determination phase” determines whether or not the defendant is guilty of the
capital crime. Next, if the defendant is found guilty, a separate “sentencing phase”
proceeding is held and both aggravating and mitigating evidence is presented and the jury
determines whether the defendant should receive the death penalty or a lesser sentence. See
Robert Alan Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing
Proceeding: Theoretical & Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating
Information, 60 UMKC L. REV. 411, 426–28 (1992).
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collateral relief.98 Trevino’s state collateral attorney raised a claim that his
trial attorney had been ineffective during the penalty phase of trial. However,
he failed to include that part of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was his failure
to conduct an adequate investigation and present mitigating evidence during
the penalty phase of trial.99
Trevino’s state collateral attorney’s error was particularly grave because
Texas law effectively makes state collateral proceedings the first forum for
defendants to raise IATC claims,100 and any such claim not raised during state
collateral review is forfeited for federal collateral review.101 In theory, within
thirty days after his sentence was imposed, Trevino’s direct appeal counsel
could have moved for a new trial on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.102 However, as discussed above, making such a motion is nearly
impossible, leaving the state collateral proceedings the first real opportunity
to raise an IATC claim. This is where Trevino’s counsel was deficient: by
failing to include a claim that trial counsel had been ineffective at the penalty
phase, the claim was precluded from federal collateral review.
After state collateral relief was denied, Trevino filed a writ of habeas
corpus pro se in federal district court. The court subsequently appointed a
new attorney—Trevino’s fourth.103 This attorney finally argued that “Trevino
had not received constitutionally effective counsel during the penalty phase
of his trial in part because of trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate
and present mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase.”104 Trevino’s
federal habeas attorney explained that trial counsel’s presentation of
mitigating evidence was clearly deficient.105 Trial counsel called only one
witness: Trevino’s aunt.106 Further investigation by Trevino’s federal habeas
98
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1915 (holding that Texas’s procedural rules require collateral
counsel to commence collateral proceedings while appeals are still pending).
99
Id. at 1915 (“[C]ounsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating circumstances
deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel[.]” (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 523 (2003)).
100
See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1915.
101
See Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415, 426 (5th Cir. 2011).
102
See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4 (2013) (requiring a motion for a new trial to be filed within
thirty days of sentencing).
103
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1915.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1916 (“Federal habeas counsel then told the federal court that Trevino’s trial
counsel should have found and presented at the penalty phase other mitigating matters that his
own investigation had brought to light.”).
106
Id. at 1915–16. She testified about Trevino’s difficult childhood, his mother’s
alcoholism, his family’s reliance on welfare, and that he had dropped out of high school. Id.
She added that Trevino was the father to one child and offered broad statements that he was
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attorney discovered persuasive mitigating evidence that reasonable and
effective trial counsel should have found.107
In the interest of federalism, the federal district court stayed the federal
proceedings so Trevino could bring this more specific IATC claim—that his
trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase because he failed to
conduct an adequate investigation and present mitigating evidence—in a
second proceeding in Texas state court.108 The state court found that Trevino
was procedurally barred from bringing the claim because it should have been
raised in the initial state postconviction proceeding.109 Despite the clearly
deficient trial investigation, the federal district court agreed with the state
court’s decision and ultimately dismissed Trevino’s habeas corpus petition
on that same basis.110 Trevino appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
agreeing that Trevino’s procedural default barred review of his petition on
the merits.111 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to
determine whether the Martinez exception applied to Texas’s procedural
scheme.112

good with children and nonviolent. Id.
107
Id. at 1916.
These included, among other things, that Trevino’s mother abused alcohol while she was pregnant
with Trevino, that Trevino weighed only four pounds at birth, that throughout his life Trevino
suffered the deleterious effects of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, that as a child Trevino had suffered
numerous head injuries without receiving adequate medical attention, that Trevino’s mother had
abused him physically and emotionally, that from an early age Trevino was exposed to, and abused,
alcohol and drugs, that Trevino had attended school irregularly and performed poorly, and that
Trevino’s cognitive abilities were impaired.

Id.
108

Id.
See id.
110
Id. Interestingly, the District Court found that even though “‘the most minimal
investigation . . . would have revealed a wealth of additional mitigating evidence,’ an
independent and adequate state ground (namely Trevino’s failure to raise the issue during his
state postconviction proceeding) barred the federal habeas court from considering the
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.” Id.
111
Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415, 426 (5th Cir. 2011).
112
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1916. Martinez was not available to Trevino because it was
decided after the Fifth Circuit dismissed Trevino’s case. However, the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in a subsequent case, Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2012), suggests that Martinez
would not have affected their decision. In Ibarra, the Fifth Circuit noted that Texas procedural
law does not explicitly require the defendant to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim in the initial state collateral proceeding because technically the law allows defendants
to raise the claim on direct appeal. Id. at 227. Accordingly, since the Fifth Circuit held the
petitioner in Ibarra was not entitled to relief under Martinez, Trevino also would not have
been eligible for relief. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1916.
109
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B. TREVINO’S MAJORITY OPINION

The Supreme Court found Texas’s system functionally the same as the
system at issue in Martinez, concluding that Trevino required the same
equitable result, an exception to the procedural default rule.113 Justice Breyer,
writing for the majority, recognized that while Texas’s procedural rules did
not explicitly forbid raising IATC claims on direct review, the “state
procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly
unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity
to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct
appeal . . . .”114
Justice Breyer identified two aspects of Texas’s procedural law that puts
it on equal footing with Arizona’s. First, Texas’s procedural system makes it
“virtually impossible” for a defendant to bring a successful IATC claim on
direct review.115 Direct appeal counsel can move for a new trial but the trial
transcript may not be available for the attorney until after the motion for new
trial deadline.116 Without the trial transcript, the attorney on direct appeal is
unable to evaluate trial counsel’s performance. More importantly, a
successful IATC claim often requires not only an analysis of the trial record,
but also additional time to investigate evidence not presented at trial.117
Second, if Martinez did not apply, “the Texas procedural system would
create significant unfairness.”118 The Court was skeptical that the procedural
scheme was enforced flexibly, as the State argued: “We do not believe that
this, or other, special, rarely used procedural possibilities can overcome the
Texas courts’ own well-supported determination that collateral review
normally constitutes the preferred—and indeed as a practical matter, the
only—method for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.”119
113

Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921.
Id.
115
Id. at 1918 (quoting Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810–811 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
116
See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4 (2013) (holding that a motion for a new trial must be filed
within thirty days of sentencing); id. at 21.8(a), (c) (a trial court must dispose of motion for
new trial within seventy-five days of sentencing); id. at 35.2(b), 35.3(c) (noting that when a
motion for a new trial is filed, the trial transcript must be prepared within 120 days of
sentencing; this deadline may be extended).
117
See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1919 (stating that frequently, ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims are supported by the trial record providing evidence of why counsel acted as
he or she did) (citing 42 G. DIX & J. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES § 29:76 (3d ed.
2011)).
118
Id.
119
Id.
114
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Additionally, while the State argued that if counsel fails to raise an IATC
claim on direct appeal, appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness might constitute
cause to excuse the procedural default, the Court noted that the State was
unable to point to a single case where appellate counsel had been found
ineffective.120 In concluding that the Texas system was fundamentally the
same as Arizona’s, the Court noted that “[t]he very factors that led this Court
to create a narrow exception to Coleman in Martinez similarly argue for the
application of that exception here.”121 In both procedural systems, precluding
the review of a lawyer’s ineffectiveness during state habeas proceedings as a
potential “cause” for overcoming a procedural default would deprive
defendants of any opportunity to assert an IATC claim.122
C. TREVINO’S DISSENTING OPINION

In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts123 criticized the majority for
expanding Martinez and hypothesized negative consequences that may result
from the majority’s broad holding. First, Chief Justice Roberts argued that
the majority’s extension of Martinez was an unwarranted intrusion on state
sovereignty.124 He emphasized traditional federalism principles, arguing that
federal courts were not intended to be an alternative forum for the
adjudication of state convictions and that constitutional claims stemming
from state convictions should be settled in state courts.125 Additionally, he
believed the “aggressively limiting language” used in Martinez “was not
simply a customary nod to the truism that ‘we decide only the case before
us,’” but was also intended to ensure the Coleman rule would remain
relevant.126 The once “crisp” limitation of Martinez had now been replaced
with ambiguous language—“an assortment of adjectives, adverbs, and
modifying clauses”127—that would make it difficult for the lower courts to
interpret and apply the new Trevino-Martinez exception.
Chief Justice Roberts tore apart the holding, asking, “how meaningful
is meaningful enough, how meaningfulness is to be measured, how unlikely

120

Id. at 1920.
Id. at 1921.
122
Id.; see also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
123
Joined by Alito.
124
See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1922 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
125
See id. at 1921–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct.
770, 787 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000)).
126
Id. at 1923 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 396 (1981)); see also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
127
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1923 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
121
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highly unlikely is, how often a procedural framework’s ‘operation’ must be
reassessed, or what case qualifies as the ‘typical’ case.”128 He predicted that
the majority’s broad language would lead to “endless . . . state-by-state
litigation.”129 He believed that these open-ended terms would allow the lower
courts to liberally interpret Trevino, thus extending the exception to more
jurisdictions.130
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts’s concern was that the majority’s
approach would “excuse procedural defaults that, under Coleman, should
preclude federal review,”131 thereby frustrating state sovereignty and denying
the states their interest in finality.132
III. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW
Although the spirit of the Trevino opinion suggests the decision will
provide more federal habeas petitioners a day in court for their ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, Trevino’s impact on prisoners’ access to federal
courts is limited for three reasons. First, Trevino’s vague language has made
it difficult for lower courts to interpret and apply its holding. Second, being
generally reluctant to expand prisoners’ access to the courts, the lower courts
have been able to distinguish different state procedural rules from Texas’s
rules. Accordingly, the lower courts have rarely applied Trevino’s holding.
Lastly, the Supreme Court in Trevino held fast to its view that the
constitutional right to effective counsel should not be extended to collateral
proceedings. Therefore, even if federal habeas review is granted under
Trevino, indigent prisoners in noncapital cases are left without counsel when
attempting to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel—claims
that are notoriously difficult to win even with the assistance of counsel.133
A. TREVINO’S BROAD LANGUAGE

While Trevino was certainly a positive development for prisoners’
rights, the Court’s holding was articulated in broad terms, without clear
guidance as to its application. The majority left several key terms in their
128

Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing the majority opinion, id. at 1921). Roberts also
believes that Trevino does not accurately reflect Texas’s procedural “operation” because a
capital murder trial is far from a typical case. See id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that
jury trials are rare and capital convictions are even less common).
129
Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1924.
132
See id. (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991)).
133
See supra Part I.B.1.
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holding undefined: Martinez applies “where . . . [the] state procedural
framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely
in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise
a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.”134 In his
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts points to these undefined terms and questions
their meaning.135 Compared to the clear exception established in Martinez—
“where the State barred the defendant from raising the [IATC] claims on
direct appeal”136—Trevino’s broad language provides little guidance in
determining when a procedural system is comparable to Texas’s.137
While Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent foresees an increase of state-bystate litigation and predicts that prisoners will use Trevino to circumvent
Coleman’s procedural default rule,138 this prediction is misguided. Martinez
and Trevino only establish sufficient “cause” in very specific circumstances,
namely where:
(1) the claim of “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2)
the “cause” consisted of there being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during
the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the
“initial” review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claim”; and (4) state law requires that the claim “be raised in an initial-review collateral
proceeding,”139

or where the “state procedural framework, by reason of its design and
operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have
a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal.”140
The first requirement alone is difficult to satisfy. Not only does it require
a successful showing of an IATC under Strickland’s two-prong standard,141
134

Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1923 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion does not
accurately reflect Texas’s procedural “operation” because a capital murder trial is far from a
typical case, noting that jury trials are rare and capital convictions are even less common).
136
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012).
137
See Devon Lash, Comment, Giving Meaning to “Meaningful Enough”: Why Trevino
Requires New Counsel on Appeal, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1896 (2014) (“Although this
flexible standard seems to be an attempt to fit the varied rules of state criminal procedure, it
gives lower federal courts little guidance in deciding what rules constitute a meaningful
opportunity in the states where they sit.”).
138
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1923 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
139
Id. at 1913 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1320).
140
Id. at 1918 (quoting Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–21).
141
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Strickland requires first, that
counsel’s performance was deficient; and second, that deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. Id.
135
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but it also requires the claim to be “substantial.”142 Meeting “Strickland’s
high bar is never an easy task,”143 especially since the court’s “scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”144 Moreover, Trevino
requires that the IATC claim be stronger than the average IATC claim as it
requires a “substantial” claim.145
Even more, under the second requirement the prisoner must have two
ineffective assistance of counsel claims—both trial counsel and state
collateral counsel146 must have provided deficient representation. The
Supreme Court has yet to mandate a clear standard to measure the
effectiveness of collateral counsel since representation in collateral
proceedings is not constitutionally required. Strickland is little help because
assessing counsel’s performance requires some professional consensus about
the standard of practice for collateral counsel—i.e., what must such a lawyer
do in handling a postconviction case? Even if the most liberal standard is
used, under Trevino, prisoners must raise two ineffective assistance of
counsel claims (against both trial and state habeas counsel), thus raising the
already high bar even higher.
The third requirement dictates that the IATC claim be reviewed for the
first time in a state habeas proceeding. Accordingly, any time where the
IATC claim was raised on direct review and again in a state habeas
proceeding is beyond the scope of Trevino.
The fourth requirement relates to the state’s procedural system and the
practicalities of raising an IATC claim prior to the state habeas proceeding.
A prisoner must demonstrate that his state’s procedural system fits one of two
circumstances: either the state’s procedural rules must explicitly bar or the
rules must effectively bar IATC claims from being raised on direct review.147
In both procedural systems, state collateral review is the defendant’s first real
opportunity to raise an IATC claim.
In sum, a petitioner must prove two ineffective assistance of counsel
claims and be subject to a procedural system comparable to the one described
in Trevino. Despite the dissent’s apprehensions about Trevino’s liberal
expansion of the Martinez exception, obtaining relief under Trevino is both
There seems to be no agreed-upon definition of a “substantial” IATC claim.
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
144
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.
145
A “substantial” IATC claim was not defined by the Court in Trevino.
146
A prisoner can also satisfy this requirement if he has an IATC claim and was
unrepresented during his state habeas proceeding. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921
(2013).
147
The third requirement is the same as in Martinez; therefore, the fourth requirement is
the more notable change.
142
143
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difficult and unlikely.
B. LOWER COURTS DISTINGUISHING AND REJECTING TREVINO

Trevino’s vague language has not led to the liberal expansion of the
Trevino-Martinez exception Chief Justice Roberts predicted; instead, the
majority’s open-ended language has actually led lower courts to interpret
Trevino very narrowly and preclude habeas relief to petitioners elsewhere.
As the following examples illustrate, lower courts have been able to
distinguish other states’ procedural rules from Texas’s so the fourth
requirement is not satisfied, thereby limiting Trevino’s impact.
In Murphy v. Atchison, the Eastern District of Illinois confirmed the
Illinois Supreme Court’s determination that Illinois law provides a petitioner
adequate opportunity to develop the record in support of an IATC claim
before direct appeal.148 Conversely, “Trevino turned on Texas law, under
which it is ‘virtually impossible for appellate counsel to adequately present
an ineffective assistance [of trial counsel] claim’ on direct review.”149 For
this reason, the Murphy court held that the Illinois procedural system is
critically different than Texas’s and outside of Trevino’s scope.150
Furthermore, federal courts have denied relief by making nuanced
distinctions. In Baze v. White, for example, the Eastern District of Kentucky
noted that Trevino “softened” the fourth Martinez requirement, “[b]ut
Trevino still requires prisoners to show that their underlying ineffectiveassistance-at-trial claim is substantial and that their initial habeas attorney
was ineffective.”151 The court understood “substantial” under Martinez to
mean “debatable amongst jurists of reason,”152 therefore demanding a full
Strickland analysis.153 Accordingly, the court avoided a full TrevinoMartinez analysis of Kentucky’s procedural system because the petitioner
148

Murphy v. Atchison, No. 12 C 3106, 2013 WL 4495652, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19,
2013) (citing People v. Krankel, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (Ill. 1984)) (holding that a defendant is
entitled to new counsel to represent him on posttrial motions alleging ineffective assistance of
trial counsel); see also Butler v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4840, 2012 WL 3643924, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 22, 2012).
149
Murphy, 2013 WL 4495652, at *22 (quoting Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918
(2013)).
150
See id. Since district court decisions are not binding over other districts, these issues
will not be resolved until they are adjudicated at the circuit court level.
151
Baze v. White, Civil No. 01–31–ART, 2013 WL 2422863, at *4 (E.D. Ky. June 3,
2013).
152
Id. at *4 (citing Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)) (articulating the
standard cited in Martinez).
153
See id.

6. LAW (FINAL TO PRINTER) 7/20/2016

522

LAW

[Vol. 105

failed to establish that the underlying IATC claim was “substantial.”154 The
court concluded that it was not ineffective for an attorney to object to
evidence on state-law grounds rather than federal-law grounds, where
counsel viewed the state-law grounds as stronger.155
In Lutz v. Valeska, the district court for the Southern District of Alabama
denied the petitioner Lutz relief because he had not alleged an IATC claim
on direct appeal and had failed to file a timely state habeas petition, despite
having appellate counsel.156 Lutz had been left to proceed pro se after his
direct appeal.157 In Alabama, in order to be appointed state habeas counsel, a
petitioner must actively request counsel from the court.158 As a result, Lutz
was never appointed state habeas counsel and he did not file a state habeas
petition. Almost a year later, now represented by counsel, Lutz filed a petition
for federal habeas review.159 The district court concluded Lutz was not
entitled to relief under Martinez and Trevino because it was his own fault for
missing the state habeas petitioner deadline. The court found that “based on
the pleadings, documents, and records in this case, . . . Lutz has not
established the existence of any ‘objective factor external to the defense that
prevented [him] from raising the claim[s] and which cannot be fairly
attributable to his own conduct.’”160 Consequently, the federal habeas court
denied relief under Martinez-Trevino. Instead the court cited Coleman,
finding “cause and prejudice” had not been established because procedural
default was due to the petitioner’s own error, and not counsel’s.161
In Fowler v. Joyner, the Fourth Circuit found that “North Carolina does
not fall neatly within Martinez or Trevino.”162 The district court had
appointed the same attorney to represent Fowler in both state and federal
habeas proceeding.163 Despite representation by four different attorneys for
his federal habeas proceedings,164 Fowler, now represented by a fifth
attorney, argued that his prior federal habeas attorneys were deficient and

154

Id.
See id. at *5.
156
Lutz v. Valeska, Civil Action No. 1:10cv950–TMH, 2014 WL 868870, at *7 (M.D.
Ala. Mar. 5, 2014).
157
Id. at *5 n.12.
158
Id.
159
Id. at *2.
160
Id. at *5 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
161
Id. at *4–5.
162
Fowler v. Joyner, 753 F.3d 446, 463 (4th Cir. 2014).
163
Id. at 464.
164
Id.
155
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thus sought relief under Martinez-Trevino.165 He argued that his new attorney
should have been appointed as “Martinez counsel” and that his case should
have been remanded to the district court to allow for further investigation of
his IATC claims.166
Under North Carolina procedural law, a motion for habeas relief must
be denied if “[u]pon a previous appeal the defendant was in a position to
adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the . . . motion but did not do
so.”167 Unlike in Trevino—where Texas law made “it highly unlikely in a
typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise [the]
claim on direct appeal”168—North Carolina law requires the “courts to
determine whether the particular claim at issue could have been brought on
direct review.”169 As a result, the Fourth Circuit found that the North Carolina
“statute is not a general rule that any claim not brought on direct appeal is
forfeited on state collateral review”170 and therefore “[i]neffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claims that are apparent from the record must be brought by
the prisoner on direct appeal.”171 Additionally, here, because Fowler’s
attorney “undertook representation after the initial-review collateral
proceeding concluded, that counsel cannot be found ineffective before or
after Martinez.”172 Accordingly, the court held that the petitioner was subject
to procedural default and that he was not entitled to relief under MartinezTrevino.173
These lower court decisions demonstrate that courts are reluctant to
extend Trevino beyond its precise conditions.174 Overall, whatever the
165

Id. at 460–61.
Id. at 460.
167
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A–1419(a)(3).
168
Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415, 428 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, Trevino v. Thaler,
133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
169
Fowler, 753 F.3d at 463 (quoting McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 589 (4th Cir. 2000)).
170
Id. at 462–63 (quoting McCarver, 221 F.3d at 589) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171
Id. at 463.
172
Id. at 465.
173
Id. at 463. However, the court noted that IATC claims that are not so apparent fall
within the Martinez-Trevino exception. Id.
174
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that it remains
unclear if Trevino applies to other claims beyond ineffective assistance of counsel. In Hunton
v. Sinclair, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the “plausible position” that Trevino may apply to
Brady claims. 732 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, it chose not to extend
Trevino due to Martinez’s limiting language and the dissent’s concern for strict limitation. Id.
In the end, the Ninth Circuit exercised judicial restraint, but its recognition of the plausible
rationale for extending the Trevino-Martinez exception to Brady claims suggests such an
extension is possible in the future.
166
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Trevino majority intended, the lower courts’ narrow interpretation and ability
to distinguish Trevino demonstrate how Trevino has fallen short of
accomplishing meaningful habeas corpus reform.
IV. TREVINO’S IMPACT ON CAPITAL DEFENDANTS IS LIMITED WITHOUT A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL
Trevino is further limited because there is no constitutional right to
counsel in federal postconviction proceedings. Although not constitutionally
required,175 almost every death penalty state automatically appoints indigent
capital defendants counsel for their state postconviction proceedings.176 For
instance, if a capital defendant is convicted under a statute that creates the
unqualified right to appointed counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings,
that right adheres before the federal habeas petition is filed.177 As a result,
counsel will be appointed with sufficient time to assist with the filing of a
habeas petition.
But the majority of states do not provide counsel for noncapital
prisoners in state postconviction proceedings by statute, and the Constitution
does not require it.178 In these jurisdictions, indigent prisoners have no choice
but to seek habeas relief pro se.179 Judges have the discretion to appoint
counsel once a federal habeas corpus petition is filed, but there are no
guarantees that they will do so.180 Consequently, if a noncapital defendant
cannot afford counsel and is not appointed counsel, the defendant must file

175
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (holding neither the Eighth Amendment
nor Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide counsel for
indigent capital defendants seeking state postconviction relief).
176
Freedman, supra note 35, at 1086. (“[In 2006] thirty-three of the thirty-seven death
penalty states” automatically appoint postconviction counsel to capital defendants.). Since
2006, the number of death penalty states has dropped to thirty-two. States with and Without
the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-andwithout-death-penalty (last visited Nov. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/62AU-P9MK.
177
See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994).
178
See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002) (“[I]n
thirty-seven states they are not automatically entitled to appointed counsel to prepare and
present petitions for state postconviction relief.”). See also John H. Blume et al., In Defense
of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 445 (2011)
(“[M]any states do not provide for the appointment of counsel to assist an incarcerated prisoner
in a noncapital collateral challenge, no matter how serious his allegations and no matter how
incapable he is of presenting his own case pro se.”).
179
Noncapital defendants can hire counsel or find pro bono counsel, but counsel will not
be provided by the state as in capital cases.
180
See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012).
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his initial federal habeas corpus petition pro se to obtain relief under Trevino.
Filing a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel is problematic for several reasons. Even
with the help of adequate counsel, it is challenging to vindicate a substantial
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and pro se prisoners face even more
difficulty attempting to do it alone. Not only do such claims “often require
investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy,” but they must also
be presented in accordance with the state’s procedures.181 Even the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that prisoners are unlikely to succeed in raising
habeas claims pro se.182 The Court has explained that “[t]he prisoner,
unlearned in the law, may not comply with the State’s procedural rules or
may misapprehend the substantive details of federal constitutional law.”183
Further, investigation beyond the trial record is often necessary for a
successful ineffective assistance claim,184 and few prisoners can adequately
investigate such a claim from the confines of a cell.185
Another consequence of not having a constitutional right to
postconviction counsel is that there is no clear standard to measure the
performance of postconviction counsel. Unlike IATC claims that are
reviewed based on the Strickland standard, the Supreme Court has not
established a standard for postconviction counsel. Without an enumerated
standard, it is unclear what conduct would be considered ineffective in a
postconviction proceeding. This lack of clarity makes it difficult for both
prisoners and attorneys when attempting to raise a claim based on Trevino in
federal court.186
IV. SUGGESTED APPROACH
Since the Supreme Court has been reluctant to construe a right to
counsel in postconviction proceedings, unrepresented prisoners inevitably
face significant barriers when asserting ineffective assistance of counsel
181

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
Id. at 1317 (“To present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the
State’s procedures, then, a prisoner likely needs an effective attorney.”).
183
Id. (referencing in a cf. citation Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 620–621 (2005)
(discussing the prison population’s educational background)).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Trevino claims (two-layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims) are more likely
to arise in capital cases because most states appoint capital defendants with attorneys for state
collateral proceedings due to the severity and finality of the death penalty. It is technically
possible for noncapital defendants to bring Trevino claims if they can afford to hire an attorney
for the state collateral proceeding.
182
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claims. To ensure prisoners are given a fair opportunity to present their IATC
claims, these claims should be heard on direct appeal, where there is a still a
constitutional right to counsel. Georgia has adopted this approach.187
However, the overwhelming majority of state and federal jurisdictions
have chosen to adopt the Supreme Court’s rule in Massaro v. United
States188: “an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a
collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have
raised the claim on direct appeal.”189 However, until the Supreme Court
declares a constitutional right to postconviction counsel, states need not
provide counsel to assist indigent prisoners in these proceedings. Therefore,
Georgia’s minority approach—requiring prisoners to raise IATC claims on
direct review or forfeit them—is the only way to ensure prisoners will be
adequately represented when litigating such a claim.
A. OVERVIEW OF GEORGIA’S MINORITY APPROACH

Georgia is the only state to require defendants to raise IATC claims on
direct appeal—regardless of the sufficiency of the record—or waive their
claims.190 The Georgia Supreme Court has expressed the view that “a claim
of ineffectiveness of trial counsel must be asserted at ‘the earliest practicable
moment.’”191 Under Georgia law, “this moment is prior to the direct appeal,
at a motion for new trial. If the defendant fails to raise the claim at such time,

187

See Bailey v. State, 443 S.E.2d 836, 837 (Ga. 1994); see also Glover v. State, 465
S.E.2d 659, 660 (Ga. 1996).
188
Ryan C. Tuck, Note, Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Blues: Navigating the Muddy
Waters of Georgia Law After 2010 State Supreme Court Decisions, 45 GA. L. REV. 1199, 1202
(2011)) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003)); see also Thomas M.
Place, Deferring Ineffectiveness Claims to Collateral Review: Ensuring Equal Access and a
Right to Appointed Counsel, 98 KY. L.J. 301, 311–12 (2010) (“In a number of states, the
defendant may elect whether to present the claim on direct appeal or in a post-conviction
proceeding. Increasingly, states have moved in the direction of deferring ineffectiveness
claims to the post-conviction process, following the lead of a number of jurisdictions that
generally preclude consideration of ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal.”).
189
Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504.
190
See Place, supra note 188, at 310 n.69 (only Georgia requires all ineffective assistance
of counsel claims to be heard on direct appeal; other states only require the claim to be brought
on direct review if the trial record is adequate to adjudicate the claim). Under the majority
approach, the bulk of IATC claims are raised in the initial collateral proceeding. However,
“[t]here may be cases in which trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record
that appellate counsel will consider it advisable to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Massaro,
538 U.S. at 508.
191
Bailey, 443 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Smith v. State, 341 S.E.2d 5, 7 (Ga. 1986)); see also
Glover, 465 S.E.2d at 660.
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it is waived.”192
After the Georgia Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Garland v. State,
the appointment of new counsel for direct appeal became virtually
automatic,193 without requiring the defendant to show that his IATC claim
has merit.194 The court decided not to impose a threshold requirement because
such a hurdle would
compel indigent defendants to proceed without benefit of counsel,
inasmuch as trial counsel could not ethically assert or argue their
own ineffectiveness, thereby placing on pro se indigent defendants
the burden of proving the existence of a meritorious ineffectiveness
claim in order to “earn” what they have a constitutional right to
receive, namely, representation by conflict-free counsel.195
The Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged that most indigent defendants
lack the legal knowledge to assert an ineffective assistance claim
themselves.196
Under Georgia’s scheme, although defendants are guaranteed new
counsel on direct appeal, the decision to bring an ineffective assistance claim
against trial counsel is left to appellate counsel.197 Thus, if appellate counsel
chooses not to bring an IATC claim on appeal, the defendant is precluded
from bringing it in collateral proceedings.198 However, if the trial attorney
also represents the defendant on direct appeal, the defendant may bring an
IATC claim on collateral review.199
While Georgia’s minority approach has its benefits, it also has its fair
share of critics.200 The strongest argument against Georgia’s system is that if
appellate counsel does not raise an ineffective assistance claim on direct
appeal, the claim is waived, and the defendant is precluded from bringing the
claim on collateral review.201 This is problematic for two reasons. First,
appellate counsel is ultimately responsible for deciding whether to include an
192

Tuck, supra note 188, at 1202.
Garland v. State, 657 S.E.2d 842, 844–46 (Ga. 2008).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 845 (citing Hood v. State, 651 S.E.2d 88, 89 (2007)) (internal citation omitted).
196
Id. (citing Reid v. State, 219 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 1975)).
197
See Williams v. Moody, 697 S.E.2d 199, 202–03 (Ga. 2010).
198
Glover v. State, 465 S.E.2d 659, 660 (Ga. 1996).
199
Moody, 697 S.E.2d at 201.
200
See, e.g., Tuck, supra note 188, at 1230–34 (outlining the shortcomings of Georgia’s
approach).
201
See id. at 1229–30 (“To critics of Georgia’s rules, this aspect of the minority approach
outweighs any of the advantages of the motion for new trial process by creating an assortment
of novel problems.”).
193
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IATC claim on direct appeal, regardless of the prisoner’s wishes.202 Second,
if the appellate attorney is also ineffective and fails to raise an IATC claim,
the prisoner is in the same position as a prisoner in a majority approach
jurisdiction.203
Additionally, without a threshold requirement, there is a greater chance
that new counsel will be appointed on direct appeal because a defendant does
not need to articulate a reason for wanting new counsel.204 Thus, unlike trial
counsel who has full knowledge of the case and can file a direct appeal
relatively quickly, newly appointed counsel has to review the client’s file and
trial transcripts before filing the direct appeal, which is a time consuming
process.205 As a result, these increased time commitments could further
backlog public defender offices. In the end, the increased pressure on public
defenders might not realistically lead to better representation on appeal.
B. ADVOCATING FOR THE GEORGIA APPROACH

Despite these flaws, Georgia’s minority approach is more beneficial to
prisoners. Although critics argue that the minority approach gives appellate
counsel too much control when deciding whether to raise IATC claims, the
majority approach leaves the prisoner in a worse position: without control or
without counsel. Under the majority approach, when IATC claims are
directed into state collateral proceedings, collateral counsel may make the
strategic decision not to raise the IATC claim or find that the claim has no
merit, thus effectively waiving the claim. Ultimately, when a defendant is
represented by counsel, the decision to raise an IATC claim is counsel’s. The
key difference is that under the majority approach, indigent, noncapital
defendants—who are not constitutionally guaranteed counsel206 and often
proceed pro se—are able to make the decision to raise an IATC claim, but
they will have to argue the claim without the assistance of counsel. On the
other hand, under the minority approach, if appellate counsel decides to raise
an IATC claim, the defendant will do so with the assistance of counsel.
Georgia’s system of requiring ineffective assistance of counsel claims
to be heard on direct appeal has several advantages over the majority
approach. First, Georgia’s approach ensures defendants will be afforded the
assistance of new counsel when raising IATC claims. Trial counsel is not
going raise an IATC claim against himself on direct appeal, so providing new
202
203
204
205
206

See Moody, 697 S.E.2d at 202–03.
The prisoner may file a federal habeas petition pro se.
See Garland v. State, 657 S.E.2d 842, 844–45 (Ga. 2008).
See Tuck, supra note 188, at 1233–34.
See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 2 (1989).
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counsel on direct appeal provides an immediate evaluation of trial counsel’s
performance. Bearing in mind the intricacy of the Strickland standard, “the
right to counsel, like the ability to expand the trial record and an audience
with the trial court, seems vital to a fair system for IATC timing.”207 The
majority approach leaves indigent noncapital defendants unrepresented to
assert these complex claims on collateral review. Conversely, the minority
approach requires that these claims be asserted on direct appeal, where
defendants are constitutionally guaranteed counsel.
Second, prisoners benefit from having IATC claims initially reviewed
on direct appeal. Under the majority approach, if an IATC claim is not raised
in state collateral review, the claim is procedurally defaulted unless a
Trevino-Martinez exception is established. Conversely, under Georgia’s
approach, if direct appeal counsel does not raise an IATC claim, the prisoner
can always raise an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in a
subsequent collateral proceeding. Since there is a constitutional right to
counsel on direct appeal, the prisoner maintains a cause of action and
appellate counsel’s performance is evaluated based on the Strickland
standard.
Third, requiring IATC claims to be heard on direct appeal allows the
defendant to move for a new trial and obtain an opportunity to expand the
trial record with the help of counsel. Because such claims often involve
evidence outside the trial record—such as evidence counsel did not discover
because of an inadequate investigation—expanding the record is essential to
having any chance of winning relief.208 Under the majority approach,
adjudicating IATC claims in collateral proceedings, the majority of
noncapital prisoners will be proceeding pro se. Expanding the trial record is
extremely difficult for pro se prisoners due to their physical incarceration,
lack of legal expertise, and monetary constraints.209 Consequently, it is
extremely difficult for pro se prisoners to successfully raise IATC claims in
collateral proceedings. Arguably, under the majority approach, the right to
effective counsel has become “a right without a remedy” because prisoners
are unable to conduct an investigation beyond the record.210

207

Tuck, supra note 188, at 1229.
See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) (“The trial record may contain
no evidence of alleged errors of omission, much less the reasons underlying them. And
evidence of alleged conflicts of interest might be found only in attorney-client correspondence
or other documents that, in the typical criminal trial, are not introduced.”).
209
See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 693–95 (2007).
210
Id. at 693.
208
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Lastly, the motion for a new trial can be a useful tool for prisoners since
it increases the chance to argue the IATC claim before the trial judge, “whose
observations of counsel’s performance in the proceedings below are likely
useful in meeting the tough Strickland standard.”211 Under the majority
approach, where such claims are aired in collateral proceedings, the collateral
proceeding judge may not always be the same as the trial judge and therefore
may be unfamiliar with counsel’s previous performance. Further, Strickland
requires judges reviewing IATC claims to give trial counsel the benefit of the
doubt. Proving ineffectiveness is even more difficult when the collateral
proceeding judge did not see trial counsel’s performance.212
In sum, Georgia’s approach better provides defendants with the
opportunity to assert IATC claims with the assistance of effective counsel.
While this approach is not perfect, the majority’s approach leaves indigent
prisoners without counsel when attempting to raise these famously difficult
IATC claims. Without the right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, the
mere ability to assert an IATC claim is more a gesture than a protection of
constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
Trevino acknowledged that a defendant could exhaust all available state
remedies but still not receive adequate counsel until a federal habeas
proceeding. Although the Court has attempted to protect a defendant’s right
to effective trial counsel, until a constitutional right to postconviction counsel
is established, the majority approach will remain flawed. The Georgia
approach gives prisoners a greater chance to protect their constitutional rights
because it recognizes how vital counsel is when asserting an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Without the right to counsel, the mere
opportunity to assert IATC is like providing a construction worker with wood
but no tools.
Overall, Trevino was a step in the right direction for prisoners’ rights.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that under Trevino’s circumstances, a
prisoner should not be deprived of the opportunity to litigate the attorney
errors that deprived the prisoner of a fair trial.213 Trevino strives to provide a
remedy where state procedural systems unjustly preclude prisoners from
bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Despite the Court’s efforts, the majority was not precise enough
211

Tuck, supra note 188, at 1228.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
213
See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013) (acknowledging that “the right to
counsel is the foundation for our adversary system”) (quoting Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.
1309, 1317 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212
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in its language, thus allowing lower federal courts to distinguish the
procedural systems of other states and thereby maintain the status quo.
Furthermore, even if Trevino’s holding had been precise and Trevino was
strictly followed, prisoners still have no right to effective counsel in collateral
proceedings. Ultimately, no matter how liberally Trevino is interpreted,
indigent noncapital prisoners will still be left unrepresented when attempting
to navigate the complex waters of federal habeas review, and that is not much
of an improvement.
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